Do you wear human skin?
If not, do you consider that a boycott?

You continue to refer to assumptions (you cite religion, “truth,” the golden rule) as though they are the foundation(s) from which my conclusions are derived. This seems to set-up a straw man of my argument, which you easily criticize as speculative (i.e., not adhering to the assumptions you attributed to my argument to begin with).

As I’ve continuously argued, I don’t accept those assumptions as axiomatic (as in the Kantian sense) or objective. My argument here, and at That Vegan Girl, is far simpler because it is derived from propositions (namely, about the badness of harm and death) that we generally hold. Now that’s an empirical claim, but it has sufficient evidence to be commonsensical. So to the issue of “soundness,” I don’t assume Ethics to be “sound” in the rationalistic Kantian model, or any other method that attempt to produce universalistic truths. That’s the straw man you have set-up that I reject.

“Sound” in the strictly logical sense is my method of choice. We seem to accept a proposition A and therefore what follows, logically, is B. This is the method I employed to criticize your assertion that you believe people can do what they choose. It seems that you have set-up implied limits to people’s actions based on how violence makes you feel or a personal repulsion to exploitation. These feelings aren’t objective, however, they act as the kinds of propositions I am concerned with Steven. I use “morally bad” as a short-hand, as I’ve done throughout this thread. It is you who imposes meaning on the phrase.

There isn’t anything in my argument that should be construed as trying to get over the is/ought gap because I don’t make the relevant kinds of inferences. I’m going from value propositions to value propositions, which follows.

I would hate to end our discussion because it’s quite interesting. I am simply fascinated with your argument.

Best,
Alex

I am not sure in a strict sense whether “nonhuman animals count” because I am not sure in a strict sense whether anyone “counts.” The closest description I’ve found to what I currently feel in regard to ethics is Pyrrhonian moral skepticism.

I do not accept the proposition that violence “is” “morally” “bad.”

I do things–like being vegan–because I’m alive and I have to do something. To not do anything is still to do something. So I do what makes the most sense to me.

But I don’t pretend that I “know” anything. I don’t pretend like anything “is” “bad” or “is” “good,” even in a “subjective” or “relative” sense. I feel like it’s a little absurd to actually believe with any conviction the values that we humans place on phenomena in the universe. A thing happens. We think it is “good” or “bad.” Why? A thing happened. And yet, people are willing to kill each other over it because they think it was “good” or “bad.” Have you read about the “is-ought problem”?

There is a practical level at which I’ll say “That’s good,” based on some vague feeling, but that level of casual understanding doesn’t seem appropriate if we’re having a philosophical conversation, if we’re establishing “principles” on which we’re going to base our lives (ethics), or especially if we’re establishing principles with which we’re going to judge or govern other people’s lives.

I’d maybe be more comfortable discussing these ideas with you at that casual level if it was clear to me that you understood and acknowledged the speculation involved in such a discussion. Your tone here and on your blog, however, suggests to me that you do believe in ethical obligation–that you do judge other people for their “unethical” actions–that you do take ethics seriously. I’m not interested in encouraging that kind of conviction.

A lot of people, including vegans here at L.O.V.E., might find some value in some idea of ethics–especially if they’re comfortable with having faith in some assumption (belief in a religion or some ‘golden rule’ etc)–but in a strict sense, at this point in my life, I personally doubt whether anything in the whole field of moral philosophy is actually “sound,” and I don’t feel like there’s any reason to pretend otherwise.

The fact that you “want exploitation to end” implies that you believe exploitation is problematic. Or else why would you want it to end? The “should” is the implied ethical content that I simply assert, without fear of extending myself too far. It follows that you don’t believe people should be free to do as they want, because of the implied ethical restraint. Otherwise, this discourse would be incoherent.

Consider your conception of love. Why do you want to “embody love,” if you weren’t implying a disapproval of the alternative: not-love? Why is non-violent vegan activism to be preferred over violence? Because you accept the proposition that violence is ethically bad.

Steven, there is a distinction here between your implicit ethical undertones (e.g. principles, emotion, etc.) and your philosophical slide to objectivism or suggesting a principle that universally holds (i.e., “We must stop animal exploitation”). I adhere to the former sort as I’ve stated, just as you do. However, I simply assert it plainly because I think that’s the most tenable ethical position. It isn’t “truth” or universal; it’s far more pragmatic than that.

But we have to get back to the crux of this conversation. You seem to be skipping steps. The first step is establishing that nonhuman animals count, and addressing the reasons that we have refused to include them in moral reasoning. The second is scope of the kind you describe in your conception of “liberation.” Both are key, intrinsic elements to “veganism” as I understand it.

I apologize if I seem to be deliberately uncooperative. I want to stay open to your argument, but this has been a tiring exchange; it has stirred up some painful memories/feelings from my experience in 2008 with VO, and your tone has been irritating because you keep asserting things as if you know they are true (“In fact, you don’t believe people are free to do what they want”).

I would question your statement that veganism is not a philosophy or a mindset. My understanding is that veganism is basically a goal: to achieve liberation for all animals. In service of this goal, we undertake certain actions (vegetarian diet, boycotting leather/fur/silk, boycotting circuses/zoos/etc). I know that today many people understand veganism as a lifestyle or set of actions, but to be fair I don’t think this was the original intention of the Vegan Society, and I don’t think it’s my intention, either.

thanks for contributing, again, elaine,
steve

Thus, I’m more interested in how vegan than why vegan.

And thus, my decision that there are a number of sufficient reasons for veganism yet no necessary ones. Veganism is an action, a lifestyle, NOT one particular mindset or philosophy.

Your negative reaction to violence is itself the principle that you are acting on. Feminist ethicists have argued this. The emotive/intellectual dualism is erroneous. A “principle” in this instance is merely a “reason for acting.”

The emotive element only becomes actionable, however, when applied coherently. In this case, anti-violence only makes sense if you are discussing the kinds of beings who can be harmed; who have an interest in not being harmed. Likewise with ‘ending oppression’. That is incoherent unless it is guided by an ontology that groups: these beings can be exploited because this is what I mean by exploitation. Again, then, it seems that capacity to be harmed is intrinsically connected to being exploited. Therefore, the “goal” of veganism is intrinsically connected to harm.

Ending or reducing harm for you is simply not far enough. I agree. Liberation beyond this follows, however, only from the initial inclusion in Ethics, the moral community, the group of beings who we should be reasoning about at all, etc. And that’s the principled element.

In fact, you don’t believe people are free to do what they want. Why are you advocating veganism? How can you a) believe that exploitation should end and b) that people are free to do as they please, that is, to exploit people? It doesn’t follow unless, again, you assume, from the outset, some principled limit. You can call these emotive, I certainly wouldn’t disagree because as I stated before the metaphysical claims of objectivism are tenuous.

“Why, Steven, does it matter that we inflict violence on nonhuman animals? Any answer that says it does matter assumes some principle that covers nonhuman animals.”

It don’t think we necessarily assume any principle if we are simply reacting to how we feel.

Maybe the disconnect here is that you say it “matters” to inflict violence on nonhuman animals. I don’t say it “matters.” I say that I have some bad feeling when it happens, and I react to that feeling and want to start a movement.

Some people may say it “matters” in some intellectual sense, but I’m not interested in that, and I don’t think that’s the business of veganism as a movement. The vegan movement exists–was created–to achieve a certain goal. To question that goal is to question the movement. Some utilitarians have done that and, in effect, co-opted veganism, trying to make it into something else. You may find some value in that activity. For me, I like the goal of ‘end oppression’; it aligns a lot more with my honest feelings than ‘prevent harm.’

I’m almost certain now there is an irreparable disconnect between us due to core differences in our understandings of ‘ethics.’ I am something of a philosophical skeptic and tend to resist any claim of ‘truth.’ At this point in my life, I am not sure whether I believe in ‘ethics’ at all. I think people are free to do what they want. This is something of a personal note and beside the point, but it may help explain why I resist your argument so strongly.

The ‘point’ here is that the agree-upon original goal of veganism and of L.O.V.E. is to end oppression. If the real, deeper goal for you is actually ‘preventing harm,’ not ‘ending oppression,’ then you might personally find more satisfaction in other movements.

warmly,
steve

I accept your proposition that my articulation of “liberation” fails to address power imbalances, latent and manifest privilege, and the underlying rationalizations that justifies this. However, you, like aiko, Ida of “The Vegan Ideal,” and those in the care tradition, are assuming that nonhuman animals are members of the moral community from the outset.

Your articulation of liberation and the problems with my initial version is only applicable if the beings in question, whom you are liberating, are assumed to count, ethically, in these decisions. The question that needs to be answered is why, in our consideration of power, are we considering nonhuman animals at all? The reason is because they are members of the community of beings whose interests, desires, life, etc. are ethically actionable.

Why, Steven, does it matter that we inflict violence on nonhuman animals? Any answer that says it does matter assumes some principle that covers nonhuman animals. That principle is the “harm principle.” Therefore, you seem to be dealing with scope — How do we treat members of the moral community — while I’m dealing with the far more basic and fundamentally important question as it pertains to nonhuman animals today, and that is, Why aren’t nonhuman animals in that community?

So I am in agreement with you and Ida and aiko on many fronts, I am simply addressing what needs to be addressed now, and that’s inclusion in the moral community or Ethics. That’s what I mean by liberation for nonhuman animals, and it wouldn’t apply to liberation for human animals, which deals with scope, not inclusion.